

Introducing a few firsts

- FIRST: Open Source project sponsored by CCSF/DT
- FIRST: Implementation of a Risk-Limiting Audit on a Ranked-Choice
 Voting contest
- FIRST: Independent validation of Dominion's RCV Tabulation



What is a Risk-Limiting Audit?

• A Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) offers a statistical guarantee:


"If a full manual tally of the paper ballots would show that the reported election outcome is wrong, an RLA has a known minimum chance, the RLA limit, of leading to a full manual tally" – Philip B. Stark

"As with other elections audit, the goal is to identify not only intentional alterations of ballots and tallies, but also bugs in election machines, such as software errors, scanners with blocked sensors or scanners skipping some ballots. " – Wikipedia



What is a Ballot-Comparison audit ?

If computers report the wrong winner, a comparison of hand-counted ballots and computer results for the sample size below has a 90% chance of catching the mistake, and a 10% chance of missing it. When a computer mistake is caught, all ballots will be hand-counted to switch the winner.



Two main types of RLA:

- Ballot Polling: Humans count a random sample of ballots and report any difference between manual percentage and computer percentage
- Ballot Comparison: Election system provide a Cast Vote Record(CVR). Humans check physical ballots in a random sample of ballots.
 RLA system check results of human count against machine count.
 - Ballot comparison is more efficient than ballot polling due to its smaller sample size, and, arguably, less error-prone on an RCV.



Anyone is welcome to check the math

audit-irv($\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{B}, c_w, \alpha[, \gamma]$)

audits $\leftarrow \emptyset$ $F \leftarrow \emptyset \triangleright F$ is a set sequences to expand (the frontier) $LB \leftarrow 0$ 3 \triangleright Populate F with single-candidate sequences for each $(c \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{c_w\})$: 4 $\pi \leftarrow [c]$ $\mathbf{5}$ $h \leftarrow \mathsf{FindBestAudit}(\pi, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{B}, \alpha[, \gamma])$ $\mathbf{6}$ $hy[\pi] \leftarrow h \triangleright \text{Record best hypothesis for } \pi$ 7 8 $ba[\pi] \leftarrow \pi \triangleright \text{Record best ancestor sequence for } \pi$ 9 $F \leftarrow F \cup \{\pi\}$ \triangleright Repeatedly expand the sequence with largest ASN in F 10 **while**(|F| > 0): $\pi \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}\{ASN(hy[\pi]) \mid \pi \in F\}$ 1112 $F \leftarrow F \setminus \{\pi\}$ 13 $if(ASN(hy[ba[\pi]]) \leq LB):$ 14 $audits \leftarrow audits \cup \{hy[ba[\pi]]\}$ $F \leftarrow F \setminus \{\pi' \in F \mid ba[\pi] \text{ is a suffix of } \pi'\}$ 1516continue for each $(c \in C \setminus \pi)$: 17 18 $\pi' \leftarrow [c] ++\pi$ $h \leftarrow \mathsf{FindBestAudit}(\pi', \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{B}, \alpha[, \gamma])$ 19 $hy[\pi'] \leftarrow h$ 20 $ba[\pi'] \leftarrow \text{if } ASN(h) < ASN(hy[ba[\pi]]) \text{ then } \pi' \text{ else } ba[\pi]$ 2122 $if(|\pi'| = |C|):$ 23 $if(ASN(hy[ba[\pi']]) = \infty):$ terminate algorithm, full recount necessary 2425else: audits \leftarrow audits $\cup \{hy[ba[\pi']]\}$ 26 $LB \leftarrow max(LB, ASN(hy[ba[\pi']]))$ 27 $F \leftarrow F \setminus \{\pi' \in F \mid ba[\pi] \text{ is a suffix of } \pi'\}$ 2829continue 30else: 31 $F \leftarrow F \cup \{\pi'\}$ **return** audits with maximum ASN equal to LB32



Overview

- SHANGRLA is an Open Source RCV-RLA project sponsored by CCSF
 - https://github.com/pbstark/SHANGRLA
 - Implementation of academic research on RCV-RLA
 - Six key contributors across the globe on the project
 - We have yet to meet each other and we all spoke different languages:
 - English, American, Australian, Java, C++, Python, JSON, CSV, and Statistics
- SHANGRLA pilot is NOT an RLA
 - It is a ballot-comparison audit of Vote By Mail ballots (~68% of total)
 - A full RLA would require inclusion of all ballots casted
 - And a separate audit method for non VBM Ballots



Acknowledgements - CCSF -

CCSF would like to acknowledge the gargantuan efforts of the team:

CCSF Team:

Linda J. Gerull CCSF, City CIO & Executive Director, Dept of Technologies Members of the San Francisco Dept of Elections

RCV Team:

Dr. Michelle Blom:

Research Fellow, School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne, Australia

Dr. Andrew Conway:

CEO, Silicon Econometrics Pty. Ltd., Australia

Peter Stuckey:

Professor, Data Science & AI, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Vanessa Teague:

Associate Professor, School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne, Australia

RLA Team:

Dan King:


CCSF Dept of Technology Consultant, CEO ViewPoint Technology, San Diego

Philip B. Stark:

Professor of Statistics, Associate Dean, Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Regional Associate Dean (Interim), College of Chemistry and Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Berkeley, CA




ShangRLA flow overview





RLA Pilot – November 2019

Assertion Risk-Limiting Audit Workflow





1.

RAIRE Tabulator/Converter – Andrew Conway - Aus

Independent verification of Dominion's tabulation

RAIRE Tabulator (Report 8)

DOE Report (Report8)

Report 8	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Loftus	59,762	66,228	83,511
Dautsch	26,901		
Tung	37,161	46,403	
Boudin	68,145	72,860	85,950

City and County of San Francisco

	Round 1			Round 2			Round 3			
Candidate	Votes	Per	entage	Transfer (Elimination)	Votes	Percentage	Transfer (Elimination)	Votes	Percentage	Transfer
SUZY LOFTUS	59,762		31.13%	6,466	66,228	35.70%	17,283	83,511	49.28%	0
LEIF DAUTCH	26,901		14.01%	-26,901	0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%	0
NANCY TUNG	37,161		9.36%	9,242	46,403	25.02%	-46,403	0	0.00%	0
CHESA BOUDIN	68,145		5.50%	4,715	72,860	39.28%	13,090	85,950	50.72%	0
Continuing Ballots Total	191,969				185,491			169,461		




1.1



Assertions Generator – Michelle Blom - Aus

Many of the the 29 audits steps can be found here:



michelleblom

Follow

michelle.blom@gmail.com

Block or report user

opular repositories				
audit-irv-cp	audit-irv-bp			
Code for generating and running ballot-level comparison audits for IRV elections.	Code for generating and running ballot polling audits for IRV elections.			
● C++ ★ 2	● C++ ★ 1			
margin-irv	NSW2015			
Margin computation for IRV elections	Data files for use with a range of code available in my repositories. Can be used with: audit-irv-bp; audit-irv-cp.			
• C++				
STV-manipulator	AZUL			
An implementation of two heuristics for computing candidate manipulations of Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections.	Framework to support policy learning for the boardgame AZUL. The purpose of this framework is to allow students			
These manipulations provide an upper bound on the margin of victory for such e	implement algorithms for learning AI players for the game evaluate the perform			
• C++	Python			



Assertion Visualizer - Vanessa Teague – Aus.

16 NEB 0 Confirmed Pruned tree in which 16-LEIF DAUTCH wins. 17 15 16 18 NEN 3 NEB 0 NEN 1 Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Pruned tree in which 17-NANCY TUNG wins. 18 15 16 NEN 0 NEB 0 16 15 Confirmed Confirmed NEB 0 NEN 2 Confirmed Confirmed Pruned tree in which 18-CHESA BOUDIN wins. Trees showing how other winners are excluded.

Now print all the assertions. This gives you an explanation of the meaning of each one.

[3]: printAssertions(WOLosers, IRVElims)

```
Not-Eliminated-Before assertions:
Confirmed: NEB 0: Candidate 15 cannot be eliminated before 16.
```

Not-Eliminated-Next assertions: Confirmed: NEN 0: Candidate 15 cannot be eliminated next when {'16', '17'} are eliminated. Unconfirmed: NEN 1: Candidate 18 cannot be eliminated next when {'16', '15'} are eliminated. Confirmed: NEN 2: Candidate 15 cannot be eliminated next when {'16', '18'} are eliminated. Confirmed: NEN 3: Candidate 15 cannot be eliminated next when {'16', '18'} are eliminated.



RLA – Philip B. Stark – Berkeley



Philip B. Stark pbstark

Follow

Eaculty at UC Berkeley / Consultant

- Outline Out
- stark@risklaw.org
- 🛨 PRO

Block or report user

Overview Repositories 22 Projects 0 Stars	s 0 Followers 50 Following 0				
Popular repositories					
Padova15	MX14				
Materials for a 30-hour course in Statistics for Engineers, given at University of Padova	Short course on nonparametric inference in auditing and litigation, XXIX Foro Internacional de Estadistica, Puebla, MX				
● CSS ★ 13 ¥ 2	● Jupyter Notebook 🔺 12 💱 5				
S157F17	Nonpar				
Statistics 157, Fall 2017, UC Berkeley	Teaching materials for nonparametric statistics				
● Jupyter Notebook 🔺 10 💡 10	●CSS ★7 ¥3				
pseudorandom	CORLA18				
	theory and code for RLAs: Colorado and San Francisco				
🔴 Jupyter Notebook 🛛 🜟 5	● TeX ★ 3 😵 4				

95 contributions in the last year



Inventor of RLA •

- Has participated in dozens of RLA
- His work is the basis for CORLA \bullet
- ShangRLA is a substantial update lacksquare

to CORLA's methods

Was "busy" in November

12



Auditor Tool - Dan King - CCSF/San Diego

💾 Home 🛛 🕈 Mark Ball	ot 📥 Expor	t Contest 🛛 🕻	& Settings			
Mark Ballot						
🕑 Help						
Contest: District Attorney						
Reviewer #	Reviewer #2 - Review and confirm (revise as needed)					
Imprinted ID: 99808-81-1						
99000-01-1						
	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	5th Choice	
8 Suzy Loftus		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	
A Leif Dautch	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	
A Nancy Tung	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	
R Chesa Boudin	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	
A Write-in	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	
A No Consensu	IS		🕼 Re	vise Seleo	ctions Confirmed	



Next Step: Taking ShangRLA from pilot to product

- Phase I:
 - Standardize on languages
 - Transition out of Jupyter notebook
 - Migrate from files to an RDBMS
 - JSON is ill-suited for a system that has a natural entity-relationship model
 - Build a test suite above and beyond unit tests
 - Document
- Phase II:
 - Support for Multi-Contest auditing
 - Integrate non-VBM Ballot auditing
 - Enhance the UI
 - ShangRLA is engineered to support various forms of contest beyond RCV
 - ...but "official support" may require further development and testing